Clustering in N-Player Preemption Games by Argenziano, Rossella & Schmidt-Dengler, Philipp
CLUSTERING IN N-PLAYER PREEMPTION
GAMES
Rossella Argenziano
University of Essex
Philipp Schmidt-Dengler
University of Mannheim
Abstract
We study a complete information preemption game in continuous time. A finite number of firms
decide when to make an irreversible, observable investment. Upon investment, a firm receives flow
profits, which decrease in the number of firms that have invested. The cost of investment declines over
time exogenously. We characterize the subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome, which is unique up to
a permutation of players. When the preemption race among late investors is sufficiently intense, the
preemption incentive for earlier investors disappears, and two or more investments occur at the same
time. We identify a sufficient condition in terms of model parameters: clustering of investments occurs
if the flow profits from consecutive investments are sufficiently close. This shows how clustering can
occur in the absence of coordination failures, informational spillovers, or positive payoff externalities.
(JEL: C73, L13, O3)
1. Introduction
Consider a game of timing in which players have to decide when to make an
investment. The cost of investing declines over time. A firm earns a positive profit
flow upon investment, but profit flows decline in the number of investors. This is a
preemption game: delay exogenously increases payoffs through lower investment cost,
but each player also has an incentive to invest early, because there is an early mover
advantage.
In a preemption game, investment by a player reduces the postinvestment flow
profit for later investors, and hence the incentive of the remaining players to invest.
Therefore, our intuition lets us expect a period of delay until the next investment occurs.
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This intuition is correct for the case of two players (Fudenberg and Tirole 1985) but,
as we show in this paper, may fail otherwise.
We study a general N -player investment preemption game and identify a
mechanism that generates clustering of investment times. When the preemption race
among late investors is very intense, the preemption incentive for earlier investors is
reduced. If this effect is sufficiently strong, two or more investments occur at the same
time. This happens when the flow profits of subsequent investments are sufficiently
close.
The mechanism we identify is novel. Both the theoretical and empirical literature
on timing games have focused on different factors that can generate clustering of
investment times. The theoretical explanations for the presence of clusters include
coordination failures, as in Levin and Peck (2003), positive network externalities, as in
Mason and Weeds (2010), and informational spillovers (e.g., Chamley and Gale 1994),
where rival investment signals a high profitability of investment. Brunnermeier and
Morgan (2010) have shown that herding occurs in a preemptive “clock game”, but they
attribute this herding effect to private information being (partially) revealed by the first
player to act. In our model, clusters are purely a result of preemption and backward
induction. Coordination failures are ruled out by assumption, rival investment has no
informational content, no positive externalities, and lowers the postinvestment flow
profit for later investors.
Our analysis therefore provides an alternative interpretation of the empirical
evidence. A large body of empirical literature has examined how rival adoption
or market entry affects the timing of a firm’s own technology adoption or market
entry. Several papers have found that adoption by a rival accelerates the adoption
by remaining firms (clusters are the most extreme form of acceleration).1 This
acceleration has been interpreted as evidence of positive payoff externalities or
informational effects, but we provide a simpler alternative explanation based purely on
preemption.
The mechanism through which clusters arise in our model is the following. Suppose
there are three firms: if being the second investor is profitable relative to being the
third, the preemption race to be the second investor is intense, and in equilibrium the
second investment occurs early. In order to obtain monopoly profits for some time, a
firm would have to invest even earlier. If monopoly profits are not much higher than
duopoly profits, no firm wants to incur the extra cost that is necessary to invest strictly
before the second investor, and the first and second investments are clustered. In a
game with more than three players, a similar mechanism can cause clusters of any
size, at any point in the investment sequence.
1. These papers find that a firm’s adoption hazard increases when a rival adopts. Karshenas and Stoneman
(1993, p. 521) interpret this acceleration of adoption as epidemic effects in the adoption of numerically
controlled machine tools. Hannan and McDowell (1987, p. 186) speak of spillover effects in the context of
ATM adoption by banks, and Levin, Levin, and Meisel (1992, p. 347) argue that there is an informational
effect via customers in the case of optical scanners in grocery stores.
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This simple mechanism, purely based on preemption, has useful implications for
the inference that can be drawn about firms profits, when the timing of investments
and the pattern of clustering are observed for a given market. Our result implies that
if investment times are generated by a preemption game and clustering is observed, a
bound on the decline in profits due to rival investment can be calculated.2
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the following, we discuss
the related literature. In Section 2, we introduce the model. In Section 3.1, we illustrate
the benchmark case of a two-player game, in which investments are never clustered
in equilibrium. In Section 3.2, we describe the mechanism that generates clustering,
in the context of the three-player game. In Section 3.3, we characterize the unique
equilibrium outcome of the N -player game. In Section 3.4, we derive a sufficient
condition on the primitives of the model for the presence of a cluster of two or more
investments. We conclude in Section 4.
Related Literature. In their seminal papers, Reinganum (1981a) and Fudenberg and
Tirole (1985) have studied technology adoption games of unobservable and observable
actions with two players, respectively. Reinganum (1981b) has derived the equilibrium
of a game of technology adoption with N firms and unobservable actions. Anderson
and Engers (1994) have studied a modified game where there is a time window in which
players decide to act, and payoffs of a static game played only among those who have
acted are collected after expiration of this time window. In two related papers, Park
and Smith (2008, 2010) have analyzed a timing game with a general payoff structure
and more than two players. See Park and Smith (2008) for the case of unobservable
actions, and Park and Smith (2010) for the case of observable actions and a continuum
of players. Goetz (1999) has discussed the case of a continuum of firms where the
preemption motive is absent.
Hoppe (2002) has surveyed the extensive literature on technology preemption
games, changing the assumptions on the information structure or the payoff structure.
Hoppe and Lehmann-Grube (2005) have studied a version of a two-player game with
a general deterministic payoff structure. More recently, Hopenhayn and Squintani
(2011) have considered a game with privately observed payoffs. Bobtcheff and
Mariotti (2011) have studied a game with uncertainty regarding the presence of a
competitor.
We rely on the equilibrium property of rent equalization to characterize conditions
for clustering. Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) have shown that, in the technology adoption
game with observable actions and two players, rent equalization must hold. They have
also illustrated why it may not hold with more than two players. The case of two
players has also been studied by Gilbert and Harris (1984) when analyzing a game
2. Identifying clusters empirically may be difficult because data often come in yearly intervals, as is the
case in the empirical literature mentioned above. Increasing access to administrative data sources alleviates
this problem. For example, Kaniovski and Peneder (2008) use social security data to identify the date of
hire of the first employee as the day of entry of a firm.
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where firms engage in lumpy capacity investments. While positive profits are earned
with unobservable actions, they have shown that there exists a class of subgame-perfect
equilibria in the game with two players and observable actions where rents are fully
dissipated. They have conjectured that their arguments extend to the N -player game.
Mills (1988) has shown that rent dissipation in a game of preemptive investment
depends crucially on the ability of firms to make costless credible threats. If credible
threats are costly (e.g., because investment must be made in temporarily separated
steps), then rents are not dissipated and profits that are almost as high as monopoly
profits can be achieved in equilibrium. Mills (1991) has analyzed a multiplayer model of
lumpy capacity investment very close to ours. Arguing that rent equalization must hold
in equilibrium, he has discussed the welfare implications of preemptive investment, and
in particular the possibility that it leads to excessive and/or premature entry. Our paper
contributes to this literature by establishing the possibility of clusters of investments,
by investigating the mechanism behind them, and by looking at their implications for
the interpretation of industry data.
Strategic investment has also been studied in a real options framework. Greater
uncertainty over the profitability of investment increases the option value of waiting
and thus the tendency to delay investment. For recent examples, see Weeds (2002)
and references therein, as well as the survey by Hoppe (2002). In independent work,
Bouis, Huisman, and Kort (2009) have studied dynamic investment in oligopoly in
a real options framework and have found comparative statics results that are closely
related to ours.3 The real options approach allows aggregate uncertainty in the payoff
process, but is restricted to a specific payoff growth process (a Brownian motion with
drift).
Bulow and Klemperer (1994) have studied a model with a seller who has multiple
identical objects and multiple buyers with independent private values. They have shown
that if buyers’ valuations are not too different, frenzies of simultaneous purchases can
occur because a purchase by a buyer increases the remaining buyers’ willingness to
pay. In our model, investment by a player lowers the flow profit achievable by the next
investor. None the less, clusters are possible if this decrease is sufficiently small, and
the ensuing preemption race to take the role of the next investor is sufficiently intense.
2. Model
2.1. The Investment Game
We analyze an infinite horizon dynamic game in continuous time. At time zero, a
new investment opportunity becomes available, and N identical players (firms) have
3. Bouis et al. (2009) have provided an explicit argument for the existence of equilibrium, and for
the existence of a cluster for the case of N D 3. For the general N -player game, they have provided
comparative statics results, under the assumption that equilibrium exists, and a numerical example.
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to decide if, and when, to seize this opportunity. The investment opportunity can be
interpreted as adoption of a new technology, or entry into a new market. Investment is
observable and irreversible.
The set of firms is denoted by N D f1; : : : ; N g and a single firm is denoted by
i 2 N .
The model corresponds to the one studied by Reinganum (1981a, 1981b) and
Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) except for the following. Until a firm invests, it receives
a constant flow of profits 0, which we normalize to zero. This assumption that
preinvestment payoffs are independent of the number of earlier investments will be
essential for obtaining a unique outcome in each subgame, which in turn guarantees
rent equalization.4 Upon investment, a firm earns flow profits of .m/, where m
is the number of firms that have already invested at a given point in time. Let
 D ..1/; .2/; : : : ; .N // denote a flow-profit structure.
Let c.t/ be the present value at time zero of the cost of investing at time t . If the
outcome of the game is that the vector of investment times is T j , for j D 1; : : : ; N ,
and firm i is the jth investor, then firm i’s payoff is
V
j
i .T
1; T 2; : : : ; T j ; : : : ; T N / D
NX
mDj
.m/
Z T mC1
T m
ers ds  c.T j /; (1)
where r denotes the common discount rate, and T NC1  C1.
We introduce the following assumptions.
ASSUMPTION 1. Flow profits .m/ are (i) strictly positive for any m and (ii) strictly
decreasing in m.
Investing always increases period payoffs for a firm, but the benefits of investing
decrease in the total number of investors: as more firms invest, competition among the
investors becomes more intense.
ASSUMPTION 2. The current value cost function .c.t/ert / is (i) strictly decreasing
and (ii) strictly convex.
The cost of investing declines over time. This may capture upstream process
innovations or economies of learning and scale. Moreover, cost declines at a decreasing
rate.
ASSUMPTION 3. (i) At time zero, the investment cost exceeds discounted monopoly
profits: c.0/ > .1/=r . (ii) Eventually, investment is profitable for all players: 9 such
that c./er < .N/=r .
Assumption 3(i) guarantees that investing at time zero is too costly. No firm would
invest immediately, even if it could thereby preempt all other firms and enjoy monopoly
4. However, the normalization of preinvestment payoffs to zero, rather than any positive constant, will
not affect the results of the paper.
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profits .1/ forever. Assumption 3(ii) ensures that the value of investing becomes
positive in finite time. The cost of investing eventually reaches a level sufficiently low
that it becomes profitable to invest, even for a firm facing maximum competition.5
In what follows, we denote by tj the j th equilibrium investment time.6 If the j th
and .j C 1/th investments occur at the same instant in time (i.e., tj D tjC1), we say
that they are clustered.
2.2. Strategies in Continuous-Time Preemption Games
We model strategies in a timing game with observable actions and continuous time
by adopting the framework introduced by Simon and Stinchcombe (1989).7 Each
player has two actions available: “wait” and “invest”. Players can move at any time
in Œ0;1/. A decision node is a point in time paired with a complete description
of past moves, and a pure strategy is defined as a function that assigns an action
to each node. An outcome is a complete record of the decisions made throughout
the game.
In this framework, the question of how to associate an outcome with a continuous-
time strategy profile is addressed in the following way. A continuous-time strategy
here is interpreted as “a set of instructions about how to play the game on every
conceivable discrete-time grid” (Simon and Stinchcombe 1989, p. 1174). For any
continuous-time strategy profile, a sequence of outcomes is generated by restricting
play to an arbitrary sequence of increasingly fine discrete-time grids, and the limit
of this sequence of outcomes is defined as the continuous-time outcome of the
profile. Simon and Stinchcombe (1989) have identified conditions for the existence
and the uniqueness of this limit. The strategies we consider here satisfy these
conditions.8
The framework of Simon and Stinchcombe (1989) is defined for pure strategies
only.9 A well-known problem with modeling preemption games in continuous time
is that, typically, games in this class do not have an equilibrium in pure strategies,
5. We discuss the implications of relaxing this assumption in Section 3.3.
6. In Proposition 1, we prove that the vector of equilibrium investment times

t
1
; : : : ; t
N

is unique.
7. Hoppe and Lehmann-Grube (2005) were the first to show how to adopt this framework to model a
preemption game.
8. The conditions required are: (F1) an upper bound on the number of moves; (F2) that strategies depend
piecewise continuously on time; (F3) strong right continuity of the strategies with respect to histories.
Condition (F1) is naturally satisfied, because investment is a one-time irreversible decision. Condition
(F2) is an explicit restriction that we impose on the strategies. We satisfy Condition (F3) by considering
strategies that depend only on how many firms have already invested but not on the time when they have
invested.
9. For N D 2, our model is a special case of Fudenberg and Tirole (1985). They developed an alternative
methodology for modeling games in continuous time, based on an extended definition of mixed strategies.
When applied to the two-player case, their methodology generates the same equilibrium outcome. We
conjecture that this would be true also for the general N -player case.
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because of the possibility of coordination failures. We explicitly rule out coordination
failures by introducing a randomization device as in Katz and Shapiro (1987), Dutta,
Lach, and Rustichini (1995), and Hoppe and Lehmann-Grube (2005).
ASSUMPTION 4. If n firms invest at the same instant t (with n D 2; 3; : : : ; N ), then
only one firm, each with probability 1=n, succeeds.
The randomization device is introduced for the purpose of ruling out the possibility
that simultaneous investments occur as a consequence of a coordination failure. At the
same time, it allows for the presence of simultaneous investments as long as they are
optimal for the firms involved.
To illustrate how the randomization device works, consider the case N D 2. First,
suppose that at a given time t each firm would like to invest, provided that the rival does
not do so. Suppose that at time t , both firms try to invest. Without the randomization
device, they would both be successful (i.e., they would both pay the cost c.t/ and start
receiving flow payoffs .2/). This would constitute a coordination failure: ex post, each
firm would regret having invested. With the randomization device instead, if at time t
both firms try to invest, then “the clock stops”. The game proceeds as follows with time
standing still. First, only one of the two firms (each with probability 1=2) successfully
invests (i.e., only one actually pays the cost c.t/). Then, the remaining firm observes
that its opponent has invested. It has two options. It can try to invest “consecutively
but at the same instant of time” (see Simon and Stinchcombe 1989, p. 1177); that is,
after observing the first investment, but at the same time t . Alternatively, it can let
the clock restart and the game continue. Because the firm observes that its opponent
has invested at t , and investment at t was optimal only provided that the rival did not
invest, it selects the second option. Hence, at t , only one firm invests and there is no
coordination failure.
Now, suppose that at time t each firm finds it optimal to invest whether or not the
rival does so. If both firms try invest at t , the clock stops. Only one firm is successful.
The remaining firm again has the option to invest or to let the clock restart. Now,
however, it will choose to invest immediately because it is optimal to do so. Hence,
there will be a cluster of two investments, which does not constitute a coordination
failure.10,11
10. For an interpretation of this randomization device, we refer to Dutta et al. (1995). An alternative
assumption is made by Dutta and Rustichini (1993). If two firms stop simultaneously, both receive a convex
combination of the payoff from being the only one to stop at that time, and the payoff from stopping later,
at the optimal time for a follower. This assumption introduces the possibility of clusters of simultaneous
investments through a mechanism that is unrelated to the one illustrated in our paper.
11. An alternative formalization of continuous-time strategies has been introduced recently by Murto
and Va¨lima¨ki (2011). To be applied in this model, it also needs to be augmented with a randomization
device to avoid the nonexistence of equilibrium.
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2.3. The Optimal Stand-Alone Investment Times
In this section, we illustrate the basic trade-off of the investment problem, abstracting
from strategic considerations. Consider the hypothetical problem of a firm who acts
as a single decision maker and has to select the optimal time to make an investment,
which has cost c.t/ and guarantees a flow payoff of .j / forever, for j 2 f1; : : : ; N g,
where c.t/ and .j / satisfy Assumptions 1–3. This firm would choose t to maximize
the following profit:
fj .t/ 
.j /
r
ert  c.t/: (2)
We denote the solution to this problem as T j . Adopting the terminology used by Katz
and Shapiro (1987), we define it as the stand-alone investment time for .j /. Observe
that fj .t/ is strictly quasiconcave and that T j is well defined12 for every j 2 1; : : : ; N
as the solution to
f 0j .t/ D 0 () .j /ert  c0.t/ D 0: (3)
At time T j , the marginal benefit from delaying investment, which is the cost reduction
c0.t/, is exactly equal to the marginal cost, which is the foregone discounted profit flow
.j /ert . Before T j , a player is willing to delay because the cost is decreasing at a
speed that more than compensates the foregone profit flow. After T j , a player would
rather invest immediately than delay. It follows from the implicit function theorem that
T j < T j 0 for j < j 0. For a larger foregone profit flow (i.e., for j < j 0), the stand-alone
time is earlier.
3. Equilibrium Analysis
We now return to the strategic environment, and solve for the equilibria of the game.
A feature of any equilibrium of the game that is built into our assumptions is the
following.
LEMMA 1. In any pure-strategy subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE), no firm
invests at t D 0, all firms invest in finite time, and the last investment takes place at
the stand-alone investment time T N .
Assumptions 1(ii) and 3(i) guarantee that investment at time zero is too costly.13
Assumptions 2(i) and 3 (ii) guarantee that all firms invest in finite time. The result that
the last equilibrium investment time is exactly the stand-alone investment time T N is
not surprising: when only one active firm is left, it maximizes the profit (2) for j D N .
12. For a proof, see Claim A.1 in the Appendix.
13. This fact is crucial in proving that all players receive the same payoff in equilibrium. Relaxing
Assumption 3(i), we could generate an equilibrium in which some players invest at time zero and receive
a higher payoff than the remaining players, who would instead invest later and all receive the same, lower
payoff.
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Next, we introduce our benchmark: the two-player investment game analyzed by
Fudenberg and Tirole (1985).
3.1. The Benchmark Case: Two Firms, No Clustering
Suppose N D 2. The easiest way to capture the intuition for this game is to use a
backward induction approach. By Lemma 1, both firms invest no later than the second
stand-alone investment time T 2 . Therefore, each firm anticipates that if it invests first
at some time t < T 2 , then the opponent will follow at T 2 . The payoff from this early
investment will then be what Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) define as the Leader Payoff:
L.t/ D .1/
Z T 
2
t
ers ds C .2/
Z 1
T 2
ers ds  c.t/: (4)
Alternatively, a firm could wait until T 2 and receive the Follower Payoff:
F.t/ D .2/
Z 1
T 2
ers ds  c T 2  : (5)
The benefit from being the leader, rather than the follower, is that high profits .1/
are earned for some period. The cost is that early investment is more expensive than
late investment. The fact that the cost of investment, although initially prohibitive, is
decreasing and convex, guarantees that the leader and follower payoff curves have the
shape illustrated in Figure 1. Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) have proved that the first
time at which an investment occurs in equilibrium, t1, is the earliest time when the two
curves intersect. In equilibrium, firms invest at different points in time14 and payoffs
are the same for both firms (i.e., there is rent equalization).
The mechanism at work is the following. If unconstrained by strategic
considerations, a single firm would like to invest at the stand-alone time T 1 . Also in
the presence of an opponent, each firm would like to invest first, at T 1 . The opponent
would then follow at T 2 . The leader would receive a higher payoff than the follower.
This cannot be an equilibrium because the firm who takes the role of the follower could
profitably deviate and preempt the opponent by investing at T 1  ". The presence of
a second player introduces a Leader Preemption Constraint (LPC) on the time of the
first investment: leader investment cannot take place at a time when earlier preemption
is profitable. As a consequence, the first investment must occur strictly earlier than
T 1 . In particular, it must occur weakly before the first intersection of the leader and
follower payoff functions. Because the leader payoff function is increasing in that
interval, the first investment will occur at the latest time that satisfies the LPC (i.e., the
first intersection of the two curves).
14. The assumption that preinvestment payoffs are constant rules out the possibility of what Fudenberg
and Tirole (1985) have defined as “late joint adoption equilibria”.
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L(t)
 t 1 T
*
1 t2=T
*
2
F (t)
FIGURE 1. No clustering in the two-player game. The LPC brings the first investment forward to
t1. Earlier preemption is not profitable: before t1, F.t/ exceeds L.t/. The figure is drawn for cost
function c.t/ D 2  104e.˛Cr/t for ˛ D 0:24, r D 0:1, and flow profits  D .440; 300/.
3.2. The Three-Firm Game: When are the First Two Investments Clustered?
In this section, we move away from the two-player benchmark and illustrate the
possibility of clustering in the context of a three-player game. As in the two-player
game, the first investment must occur strictly earlier than T 1 . The key difference
from the two-player game is that t1 is identified by the presence of two constraints.
One is the LPC constraint discussed above. The second is what we call the Follower
Preemption Constraint (FPC). The latter reflects the fact that the first investment is
followed by a preemption race among the remaining two players. This race among
followers determines an upper bound on the time of the first investment.
The aim of this section is twofold. First, we show that the first and second
investments can be clustered or not clustered. Which case occurs depends on which
of the two constraints on t1, the FPC or the LPC, is binding in equilibrium. Then, we
examine how the model primitives determine which constraint is binding. We proceed
by solving the game by backward induction. Figure 2 illustrates.
The Two-Firm Subgame. Suppose that the first investment has occurred, and consider
the ensuing two-firm subgame. This is analogous to the two-firm game of Section 3.1
By Lemma 1, all firms must invest by T 3 . Each firm anticipates that if it invests first
at some time t < T 3 , the opponent will follow at T 3 . The leader payoff and follower
payoff for this subgame are
L2.t/ D .2/
Z T 
3
t
ersds C .3/
Z 1
T 3
ersds  c.t/ and (6)
F2.t/ D .3/
Z 1
T 3
ersds  c.T 3 /; (7)
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respectively. The threat of preemption guarantees that the first investment in the
subgame must take place at the earliest time when L2.t/ D F2.t/. The second
investment time in the game, t2, coincides with this intersection. The last investment
occurs at T 3 .
The Follower Preemption Constraint. The conclusion above that the second
investment occurs at the earliest intersection of L2.t/ and F2.t/ clearly assumes that the
first investment must occur weakly before this intersection. We show by contradiction
that this must be the case in equilibrium. Suppose that the first investment took place
strictly later, at some time   T 3 . A two-firm subgame would then start at  . Because
L2./ > F2./, both firms would prefer to be leader rather than follower in this
subgame. They would both try to invest at  ; one would succeed and the other would
invest later at T 3 . This cannot be an equilibrium because each of the last two investors
receives a lottery between L2./ and F2./, while it could deviate and guarantee itself
a payoff arbitrarily close to L2./. Deviating by investing at   ", a firm would be
the first investor in the game. It would trigger a two-firm subgame in which one more
investment would occur at   " and the last one at T 3 . Therefore, the deviator would
receive a payoff of L2.  "/.
We have established that the time of the first investment t1 is constrained by the
presence of a preemption race in the ensuing two-firm subgame: to guarantee that
there is rent equalization in this race, t1 must be no later than the first intersection
of the leader and follower payoff curves of the two-firm subgame (i.e., L2.t/ and
F2.t/). We call this the FPC. Because the second investment time t2 coincides with
this intersection, we say that the FPC is binding in equilibrium if the first investment
occurs exactly at t2, and not binding if it occurs strictly earlier than t2.15
The Leader Preemption Constraint. We now illustrate the LPC for the three-player
game. It follows from the analysis above that the second and third investments will
occur at t2, with L2.t2/ D F2.t2/, and t3 D T 3 , respectively. The FPC requires that
the first investment occurs weakly earlier than the first intersection of L2.t/ and F2.t/.
Therefore, the leader payoff in the three-player game (i.e., the payoff of the first
investor) is
L1.t/ D .1/
Z t
2
t
ers ds C .2/
Z T 
3
t
2
ers ds C .3/
Z 1
T 3
ers ds  c.t/: (8)
The follower payoff in the three-firm game (i.e., the payoff from being either the
second or the third investor) is
F1.t/D.2/
Z T 
3
t
2
ers ds C.3/
Z 1
T 3
ers ds  c.t2/D.3/
Z 1
T 3
ers ds  c.T 3 /:
(9)
15. Observe that in the two-player game in Section 3.1 this constraint is absent. After the first investment,
there is a single follower left, whose investment time is not determined by a preemption race but by a
single-agent decision problem.
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As in the two-player game, there is a LPC: the first investment cannot occur at a time
such that earlier preemption is profitable, because otherwise any of the followers would
have a profitable deviation. We say that the LPC on t1 is binding in equilibrium if given
the subsequent investment times t2 and t3, L1.t/ > F1.t/ for some t < t2. Otherwise,
preempting the leader is never profitable, and we say that the LPC is not binding.
The Relationship between FPC and LPC. The FPC reflects the intensity of the
follower preemption race that starts after the first investment: the more intense this
race is, the earlier is the first intersection of L2.t/ and F2.t/ (i.e., the earlier t2 is).
The LPC instead reflects the intensity of the race to be the first investor. These two
constraints are not independent. The intensity of the race to be the first investor is a
direct consequence of the intensity of the follower preemption race between the second
and third investors. Hence, the LPC is directly affected by the FPC.
To capture this relationship between the two constraints, note that the more intense
the follower preemption race is, the earlier t2 is, and hence the tighter the constraint
on t1 imposed by the FPC becomes. At the same time, the earlier t2 is, the shorter
the period becomes for which the first investor earns monopoly profits: early t2 makes
the role of the first investor less desirable. Therefore, the more intense the follower
preemption race is, the less intense is the race to be the first investor: the stronger the
FPC, the weaker the LPC.
The key observation of our analysis is that for any given set of parameters, only
one of the two constraints is binding, and which constraint is binding is equivalent
to whether the first two investments are clustered or not. If the follower preemption
race is sufficiently intense, only the FPC is binding, and investments are clustered.
Otherwise, only the LPC is binding, and investment times are different. We discuss
these two cases in the following, and illustrate them in Figure 2.
L2(t)
L1(t)
T1
* T2
*t1=t2 t3=T
*
3
↑
F1(t) = F2(t)
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*
3
↑
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L2(t)
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3
↑
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FIGURE 2. Clustering versus no clustering. In all three panels, the third investment occurs at T 3
and the second at the first intersection of L2.t/ and F2.t/. Duopoly profits decrease from Figure 2(a)
to 2(c), delaying the second investment time t2. In Figures 2(a) and 2(b), t2  T 1 , so in the race
to be first, F1.t/ exceeds L1.t/ before t2. Hence, only the FPC is binding and investments are
clustered. Figure 2(b) represents the cutoff case with t2 D T 1 . In Figure 2(c), t2 > T 1 . Therefore,
L1.t/ exceeds F1.t/ before t2 and the LPC alone is binding. The cost function is the same as in
Figure 1. Flow profits  are .440; 300; 150/ for Figure 2(a), .440; 280:2; 150/ for Figure 2(b), and
.440; 240; 150/ for Figure 2(c).
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First, observe that the leader payoff L1.t/ is strictly quasiconcave, and maximized
at T 1 . By construction, it intersects F1.t/ in t2. Which constraint is binding depends
on the relative position of t2 with respect to T 1 . The intuition for this is that T 1 , being
determined by .1/, reflects the desirability of the role of the first investor, and hence
the strength of the LPC, while t2 reflects the strength of the FPC.
Case 1: t2  T1 (Figures 2(a) and 2(b)). The LPC is not binding, because the
follower payoff F1.t/ exceeds the leader payoff L1.t/ at any t < t2. The first
investment occurs exactly at t2: the FPC is binding. The payoffs of all players are
equalized. The first two investment times are clustered: t1 D t2.
Case 2: t2 > T1 (Figure 2(c)). The LPC is binding, because the leader payoff L1.t/
exceeds the follower payoff F1.t/ to the left of t2. The preemption race to be the first
investor brings t1 forward to the earliest intersection of leader and follower payoffs.
The payoffs of all players are equalized. The FPC, instead, is not binding. The first
two investments are not clustered: t1 < T 1 < t2.
How Model Primitives Determine the Presence of a Cluster. As can be seen in
Figure 2, whether Cases (1) or (2) will occur is equivalent to whether L2.t/  F2.t/—
the incentive to preempt in the two-player subgame that follows the first investment—is
positive or negative when evaluated at T 1 .
In the cutoff case of Figure 2(b), the preemption incentive evaluated at T 1 is zero:
the first intersection of L2.t/ and F2.t/, which identifies t2, coincides exactly with
T 1 . The follower preemption race is just intense enough to make the FPC binding and
the LPC not binding. If, instead, the first intersection of L2.t/ and F2.t/ occurs to the
left of T 1 , as in Figure 2(a), then the preemption incentive L2.t/  F2.t/ evaluated
at T 1 is strictly positive. Conversely, if it occurs to the right of T 1 , as in Figure 2(c),
then L2.t/  F2.t/ evaluated at T 1 is strictly negative.
The previous observation allows us to identify the parameter range for which Cases
(1) and (2) occur, respectively. By evaluating the preemption incentive L2.t/  F2.t/
at T 1 , we obtain
L2.T

1 /  F2.T 1 / D .2/
Z T 
3
T 1
ers ds C .3/
Z 1
T 3
ers ds  c.T 1 /

 
.3/
Z 1
T 3
ers ds  c.T 3 /
!
D .2/
r

erT 1  erT 3

 c.T 1 /  c.T 3 / : (10)
Recalling that T 1 is a decreasing function of .1/ and T 3 is a decreasing function
of .3/, we observe that the preemption incentive evaluated at T 1 is a function of
the three profit parameters .1/, .2/, and .3/. For profit structures such that the
preemption incentive (10) is nonnegative, the first two investments are clustered; for
all other profit structures, clustering does not occur.
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The preemption incentive (10) is monotonic in each of the profit parameters, .1/,
.2/, and .3/. The intuition is captured by looking at how each of them affects
the relative strength of the two constraints. First, the preemption incentive (10) is
decreasing in .1/. Hence, starting from the cutoff case, by increasing .1/ we fall
into Case (2) (no clustering). The intuition is that an increase in .1/ makes the role of
leader of the three-player preemption race more attractive. Hence, the LPC becomes
binding.
Next, consider .2/ and .3/. The preemption incentive (10) is increasing in
.2/ and decreasing in .3/. Hence, starting from the cutoff case, increasing .2/
or decreasing .3/, there continues to be a cluster. The intuition is that an increase
in .2/ or a decrease in .3/ makes the role of the second investor more attractive
relative to the role of third investor. The preemption race among the followers becomes
more intense, and this brings t2 forward. The FPC becomes stronger. At the same time,
earlier t2 makes the role of the first investor less attractive, so the LPC becomes weaker.
In Section 3.4, we show that the intuition above can be translated into a sufficient
condition for the presence of a cluster: given any pair ..1/; .3//, if .2/ is sufficiently
close to .1/, then the first and second investments are clustered.
3.3. The General Case: N Firms
In this section, we formalize and generalize our characterization of the equilibrium
outcome of the game with three players to the general case of N players.
After the first j  1 investments have taken place, two constraints determine the
next investment time tj . First, the LPC: preempting the leader of the current subgame
(i.e., the j th investor) by investing earlier than tj must not be profitable. Second, the
FPC: tj must be weakly earlier than the time of the next investment tjC1, which is
determined by the preemption race in the subgame played by the followers after the
j th investment.16
Proposition 1 establishes that the equilibrium outcome of the game is unique, and
that the rent-equalization result is preserved even for a general number of players.
It allows us to construct a simple recursive algorithm with which to compute the
equilibrium investment times and to determine the presence of clusters.
PROPOSITION 1. The game admits a unique pure-strategy SPNE outcome, up to a
permutation of players. The equilibrium has the following properties.
(i) All players receive the same payoff.
(ii) The jth and the .j C 1/th investments are clustered if and only if the .j C 1/th
investment time tjC1 is weakly earlier than the j th stand-alone investment time
T j .
16. The above discussion holds for j  N  2. In equilibrium, the last two investment times are the
equilibrium outcome of a subgame that resembles the two-firm game illustrated in Section 3.1.
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In equilibrium, all players earn a payoff equal to that of the last investor:
.1=r/.N /erT N  c.T N /. The rent-equalization result of Fudenberg and Tirole
(1985) extends to the N -player game because we assume that preinvestment payoffs
are constant. This, in turn, implies that in each preemption race the follower payoff is
independent of the exact time of earlier investments. While the game admits a unique
equilibrium outcome in terms of investment times and equilibrium payoffs, the role
taken by each investor in the investment sequence is not uniquely identified.17
Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 suggest the following simple recursive algorithm to
compute the equilibrium investment times .t1; t2; : : : ; tN / and determine the presence
of clusters.
1. The last investment time is equal to the last stand-alone investment time: tN D T N .
2. For j < N , (i) if tjC1  T j , then there is a cluster: tj D tjC1; (ii) if tjC1 > T j ,
then tj < tjC1, and tj solves the rent-equalization condition
Lj .t/  Fj .t/ D .j /
Z t
jC1
t
j
ersds  c.tj / C c.tjC1/ D 0
where Lj .t/ and Fj .t/ are defined analogously to L1.t/ and F1.t/.18
Case (i) is analogous to Case (1) in Section 3.2: the FPC alone is binding. Case (ii)
is analogous to Case (2) in Section 3.2: the LPC alone is binding.
Proposition 1 has two implications that go beyond the features of the three-
player example. First, for N > 3, clusters can include more than two simultaneous
investments. For example, suppose that the preemption race for the role of the .j C 1/th
investor is sufficiently intense that not only tjC1 < T j , but also tjC1 < T j1 < T j ;
in this case, the .j  1/th, j th, and .j C 1/th investments will be clustered. In Section
3.4, we illustrate how model primitives affect the size of a cluster.
Second, clusters can occur not only at the beginning, but at any point of the
investment sequence, except for the last.19
17. In a symmetric equilibrium, all firms that have not yet invested try to invest at every equilibrium
investment time. The realized order of investments is determined by the randomization device. In an
asymmetric equilibrium, the order of investments can be predetermined or partially random. For instance,
the randomization device can be used to determine only the first investor. Firms can then coordinate on the
identity of later investors based on this outcome. We thank a referee for pointing this out.
18. For a formal definition, see the proof of Proposition 1 in the Appendix.
19. If investment is not profitable for all players, so that entry is effectively endogenous, then a cluster can
also occur at the end of the investment sequence. Suppose we relax Assumption 3(ii) so that only M < N
can profitably invest. After the .M  1/th investment, there is a race among the remaining active players
to secure the last profitable investment possibility. By rent equalization, the last investor (as well as all the
predecessors) must earn the same equilibrium payoff as the .N  M/ players who do not invest, which
is zero. The last investment is thus brought forward to a time t
M
earlier than the stand-alone time T 
M
. If
t
M
< T 
M1
, then there is a cluster at t
M1
D t
M
. In the baseline model instead, the last investment time
t
N
is T 
N
, and therefore it is always strictly later than T 
N1
.
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FIGURE 3. The size of a cluster. In all three panels, N D 5, the cost function is c.t/ D
2  104e.˛Cr/t , with ˛ D 0:4 and r D 0:1, and the flow profits ..1/; .2/; .4/; .5// are
.340; 320; 280; 270/. Triopoly profits .3/ increase from 300 in Figure 3(a) to 308 in Figure 3(b),
and to 316 in Figure 3(c). The investment times t4 and t5 are unaffected by this increase (Remark
1). Also, T 1 and T 2 are the same in all panels. In Figure 3(a), T 1 < T 2 < t3 and no cluster occurs.
In Figures 3(b) and 3(c), the larger .3/ brings the third investment time t3 forward (Proposition 2).
In Figure 3(b), .3/ is sufficiently close to .2/ such that T 1 < t3< T 2 and the second and third
investments are clustered. In Figure 3(c), a further increase of .3/ makes it sufficiently close to
.1/, such that t3 < T

1 < T

2 and the first three investments are clustered (Proposition 3).
3.4. The Condition for a Cluster
In Section 3.2, we illustrated the mechanism that leads to clustered investments in the
special case of N D 3. We introduced the LPC and the FPC and provided an intuitive
discussion of how the model parameters affect these two constraints and determine
the presence or absence of a cluster. In this section, we formally investigate how the
mechanism illustrated in Section 3.2 relates to the model primitives. More precisely, we
ask under which condition on the parameters of the model are two or more subsequent
investments clustered, at any point in the investment sequence.
The answer is that they are clustered if the associated flow profits are sufficiently
close. To obtain this result, we first argue that whether two subsequent investments
are clustered or not depends only on a subvector of the profit structure  . Second, we
present a comparative statics result relating investment times and flow profits. Third,
we identify a sufficient condition on the profit structure for a cluster of two or more
investments. Figure 3 illustrates the analysis.
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We start by observing that the equilibrium characterization in Proposition 1 implies
the following.
REMARK 1. The condition for a cluster of two subsequent investments is independent
of the flow-profit parameters associated with earlier investments.
Proposition 1 states that whether the j th and .j C 1/th investments are clustered is
determined by the comparison of the stand-alone investment time T j and the .j C 1/th
equilibrium investment time tjC1. Hence, the condition for a cluster depends only
on the flow-profit parameters affecting T j and tjC1. As illustrated in Section 2.3,
T j depends only on the flow-profit parameter .j /. To see which profit parameters
determine tjC1, consider the algorithm identifying the equilibrium investment times.
The last investment occurs at tN D T N , and hence it depends only on one flow-profit
parameter, .N/. The previous investment time tN1 depends on .N  1/ and on the
flow-profit parameters that affect tN (i.e., on .N/). Continuing to apply the algorithm,
it follows that tjC1 depends only on .j C 1/ and on the flow-profit parameters that
affect later investments (i.e., on the vector ..j C 1/; .j C 2/; : : : ; .N //).
We now present a comparative statics result that will play a key role in the
construction of the sufficient condition for a cluster.
PROPOSITION 2. Each equilibrium investment time is decreasing in the associated
flow profit.
For expositional purposes, consider a profit structure such that the equilibrium
investment times tj and tjC1 are different. An increase in .j / makes the role of the
j th investor more profitable. Rent equalization requires that the jth investor receives
the same equilibrium payoff as the .j C 1/th investor. The latter is unaffected by
the increase in .j /. Hence, in equilibrium, an increase in .j / has to be offset
by an increase in the investment cost. This implies bringing tj forward, because the
investment cost is decreasing in time.
The monotonicity of equilibrium investment times in flow profits leads to our main
result. An increase in .j / brings tj forward. For sufficiently large .j / (i.e., for
.j / sufficiently close to .j  1/), tj occurs at a time earlier than T j1. This results
in a cluster of the j th and .j  1/th investments. By the same mechanism, if .j / is
sufficiently close to .j  2/, the investment time tj is brought forward to a time even
earlier than T j2. This results in a cluster of three investments: tj2 D tj1 D tj .
Figure 3 illustrates this mechanism. More generally, for any j 2 f2; : : : ; N  1g and
k 2 f1; : : : ; j  1g, the sufficient condition for a cluster of two or more investments is
as follows.
PROPOSITION 3. If .j / is sufficiently close to .j  k/, then the jth investment is
clustered with the previous k investments.
To capture the intuition for this result, consider the simplest case of a cluster of two
investments. Suppose that the parameter values are such that the j th investment is not
clustered with the previous one. Consider an increase in the flow profits .j /. How does
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it affect the preemption incentives in the game? The same reasoning as illustrated in
Section 3.2 and Figure 2 for N D 3 and j D 2 applies here. The .j  1/th investment
time is determined by the FPC and the LPC. Everything else equal, an increase in .j /
makes the role of the j th investor more attractive. Therefore, the follower preemption
race in the subgame starting after the .j  1/th investment becomes more intense.
This brings forward the investment time tj , which constitutes the upper bound on the
investment time tj1 stemming from the FPC. In turn, an earlier investment time tj
makes the role of the .j  1/th investor less attractive, so the preemption race for
the role of the .j  1/th investor is less intense, and the LPC becomes weaker. The
natural question is whether it is possible to increase .j / to such an extent that the
FPC becomes binding and the LPC becomes not binding. Proposition 3 provides a
positive answer, as follows. For any value of the remaining primitives of the model,
it is always possible to find .j / strictly smaller than .j  1/ but sufficiently close
to it, such that the FPC is binding, the LPC is not binding, and the j th investment is
clustered with the previous one.
We conclude with a remark regarding what can be learned about profits, when data
on the timing of investments are observed. Our result says that clustering of entry or
adoption times does not imply that payoffs are not declining in rival investment. If
investment times are generated by a preemption game and clustering is observed, this
implies a bound on the decline in profits due to rival investment. In the case where
only time-aggregated information is available, for instance in the form of annual data,
bounds could nevertheless be obtained but would be less informative the higher the
level of temporal aggregation.
Consider the case N D 3. If we the investment cost function and the interest rate,
then we can find .3/ because it is the unique solution to the stand-alone problem
in (2) given T 3 . Knowing T 3 and .3/, we can find .2/ by plugging the observed
t2 into the rent-equalization condition L2.t2/ D F2.t2/. If t1 < t2, we can repeat the
same procedure and use L1.t1/ D F1.t1/ to find .1/. If, instead, t1 D t2 (i.e., there
is a cluster), we can infer that .1/ must be small enough, such that T 1 > t2. Thus, an
upper bound N.1/ for .1/ as a function of t2 can be obtained. This implies that .1/
must lie in the interval Œ.2/; N.1/:
4. Conclusions
In this paper, we have analyzed an N -player preemption game in which the players’
payoffs before investing are constant (and normalized to zero). The game has a unique
equilibrium outcome, and the rent-equalization result of the two-player game analyzed
by Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) is preserved.
We find that clusters of simultaneous investments are possible. When the
preemption race among late investors is very intense, the preemption incentive for
earlier investors is reduced. If this effect is sufficiently strong, two or more investments
occur at the same time. We characterize a sufficient condition on the model primitives
for two or more investments to be clustered: the flow profits of subsequent investments
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must be sufficiently close. Our results imply that the observation of investment
clustering in preemptive environments need not reflect informational spillovers,
positive externalities, or coordination failures. Instead, clustering implies a bound
on the decline in profits due to rival investment.
Appendix
CLAIM A.1. For any j 2 f1; 2; : : : ; N g:
(a) the function fj .t/ is strictly quasiconcave in t;
(b) it admits a unique global maximum in T j , defined as the solution to
f 0j .t/ D 0 () .j /ert  c0.t/ D 0I
(c) fj .T j / > 0 and T j < T j 0 for j < j 0.
Proof. Part (a). We prove that the function is strictly quasiconcave, by showing that
in every critical point of the function the second derivative is strictly negative. The first
derivative f 0j .t/ is equal to ..j /ert  c0.t// and the second derivative f 00j .t/ is
equal to .r.j /ert  c00.t//. Using f 0j .t/ D 0, we can rewrite f 00j evaluated at any
critical point as
f 00j .t/ D c0.t/r  c00.t/: (A.1)
By Assumption 2, ert .c0.t/ C rc.t// < 0 and ert .2c0.t/r C c.t/r2 C c00.t// > 0.
Together, these two inequalities imply that expression (A.1) is negative.
Part (b). We prove that the first-order condition f 0j .t/ D 0 admits a solution and
hence characterizes the unique global maximum of the function by showing that f 0j .t/
is positive at zero and negative for sufficiently large values of t . Assumptions 1 and 3
guarantee that fj .t/ is negative at zero and positive at a later time. Quasiconcavity then
implies that f 0j .0/ > 0. Moreover, because fj .t/ is continuous and is either always
increasing or single peaked, it admits a limit as t goes to infinity. This limit must
be greater than or equal to zero by Assumption 3(ii). It must also be smaller than or
equal to zero because limt!C1 fj .t/ D  limt!C1 c.t/. Hence, the only possible
candidate limit is zero. However, if that is the case, because the function is positive
from some  onwards, as t goes to infinity it must approach zero from above. Hence,
it must be decreasing for t sufficiently large. Therefore, we conclude that the function
fj .t/ admits a critical point.
Part (c). Assumptions 2(i) and 3(ii) imply that fN .t/ is strictly positive for any
t  T N . Thus, Assumption 1(ii) implies that fj .T j / > 0 for all j .
Finally, note that by the implicit function theorem
@T j
@.j /
D e
rT 
j
f 00j .T j /
< 0;
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where the inequality holds because T j is a maximum, and hence the denominator is
negative. Therefore, Assumption 1(ii) implies that T 1 < T 2 < : : : < T N . 
Proof of Lemma 1. Assumptions 1(ii) and 3(i) guarantee that there is no investment at
time zero; the cost of investing immediately is higher than the maximum amount of
profits a firm can obtain in this game.
The proof of the result that all firms invest in finite time, and that the last investment
takes place at the stand-alone investment time T N , is split into two parts. First, we
show that in equilibrium, at any decision node with one active firm and calendar time
t , the firm plays “wait” if t < T N and “invest” otherwise. Then, we show that in any
decision node with t  T N any number of active firms play “invest”.
The payoff of a single active firm from investing at time t is fN .t/, defined in
equation (2). From Claim A.1, fN .t/ has a strict global maximum in T N and its
maximum value is strictly positive. Therefore, a single active firm will optimally play
“wait” if t < T N and “invest” otherwise.
Next, consider decision nodes with t  T N and two active firms. We show that
both firms must invest exactly at t .
First, suppose that at t they both play “invest”. By Assumption 4, only one of them
succeeds and the game enters a subgame with one active firm. As we proved above, this
firm invests immediately, so both firms invest at time t and receive payoff fN .t/. No
firm has an incentive to deviate from these strategies. With two active firms, deviating
and playing “wait” would not change the outcome, nor the deviator’s payoff. The non-
deviating firm would invest immediately. The game would therefore enter a subgame
with one active firm in which the deviator would optimally invest immediately, as we
proved above.
Next, suppose that at time t only one of the two active firms plays “invest”. The
outcome is again that both firms invest at t , because after one firm invests the game
enters a subgame with one active firm, in which it is optimal to invest immediately. No
firm has an incentive to deviate from these strategies. The firm who plays “wait” has no
incentive to deviate because the outcome, hence its payoff, would be unchanged. Now,
suppose that the firm who plays “invest” deviates. It would receive a payoff of either
zero, if it never invests, or fN ./, if it invests at some  > t . Because fN ./ is positive
and strictly decreasing in the interval considered, the deviation is not profitable.
Finally, suppose that at time t both firms play “wait”. The argument immediately
above shows that each firm would be better off by deviating and playing “invest” at t .
Repeating the same argument for ` D 3; : : : ; N , it follows that in any SPNE, at
any decision node with t  T N and any number ` of active firms, at least one of these
plays “invest”, and the claim follows immediately. 
Proof of Proposition 1. Through a series of Lemmata, we show that the game admits
a unique SPNE outcome, and we characterize its properties. The proof is articulated
in the following steps.
Denote by tj the SPNE investment time of the j th investor, for j 2 f1; : : : ; N g.
In Definition A.1, we introduce three functions: Lj .t/, Fj .t/, and their difference
Dj .t/. In Lemmata A.1 and A.2, we characterize their properties. Over a well-defined
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subset of their domain, Lj .t/ and Fj .t/ can be interpreted as the payoff of the j th
investor and the .j C 1/th investor, respectively, if the j th investment takes place
at t and the following investments take place at tjC1; : : : ; tN , respectively. In the
definition, the existence and uniqueness of the SPNE investment times are assumed.
In the development of the proof, they will be proved. The existence and uniqueness of
tN D T N have been proved in Lemma 1.
In Lemma A.3, we establish that in any subgame with one active firm, it plays
“wait” before T N and “invest” from T N on. In Lemma A.4, we prove that there exists
a time TN1 < T N in which LN1.TN1/ D FN1.TN1/, and in Lemma A.5 we
prove that this is the unique .N  1/th equilibrium investment time. Therefore, the
equilibrium payoff of the last two investors is the same.
Finally, in Lemmata A.6, A.7, and A.8, we identify the algorithm for the
construction of the equilibrium investment times tj for j 2 f1; : : : ; N  2g, identifying
the condition for clustering, and we prove that rent equalization holds in equilibrium
for all players. The argument is based on the induction principle. Lemma A.6 proves
that there exists an algorithm to identify the unique tN2, given tN1 and tN , and
that the equilibrium payoff of the last three investors is the same. Lemma A.7
shows that if an analogous algorithm can be used to identify a unique value of
tNl , given tNlC1; : : : ; tN , and rent equalization holds for the last l players, then
the same algorithm identifies a unique value for tNl1, given tNl ; : : : ; tN , and
rent equalization holds for the last l C 1 players. Lemma A.8 applies the induction
principle to prove that the algorithm can be used to construct the SPNE investment
times t1; : : : ; tN2 and rent equalization holds for all players. 
DEFINITION A.1. For each j 2 f1; : : : ; N  1g; we define the following three
functions over the interval Œ0; T N :
Lj .t/  .j /
Z t
jC1
t
ersds C
NX
mDjC1
.m/
Z t
mC1
t
m
ersds  c.t/
Fj .t/ 
NX
mDjC1
.m/
Z t
mC1
t
m
ersds  c.tjC1/
Dj .t/  Lj .t/  Fj .t/ D .j /
Z t
jC1
t
ersds  c.t/ C c.tjC1/
where tNC1  C1.
Notice that Fj .t/ is constant with respect to t .
LEMMA A.1.
(i) The function Dj .t/ attains a unique global maximum in T j , for
j 2 f1; : : : ; N  1g:
(ii) Dj .T j /  0 for j 2 f1; : : : ; N  1g:
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Proof. Part .i/: Notice that
Dj .t/ D .j /
Z t
jC1
t
ersds  c.t/ C c.tjC1/ (A.2)
and fj .t/ as defined in equation (2) differ by a finite constant. By Claim A.1, fj .t/
attains a unique global maximum in T j , hence the same is true for Dj .t/.
Part .i i/. Because Dj .tjC1/ D 0 and T j is the unique global maximizer, it holds that
Dj .T

j /  0: 
LEMMA A.2.
(i) If T j  tjC1; then 9Tj 2 .0; T j ; such that Dj .Tj / D 0.
(ii) If T j > tjC1; then Dj .t/ < 0 and D0j .t/ > 0 8t < tjC1.
Proof. Because Dj .t/ and fj .t/ differ by a finite constant, Claim A.1 implies that
Dj .t/ is strictly quasiconcave. Also, Dj .0/ < 0, because
Lj .0/ D .j /
Z t
jC1
0
ersds C
NX
mDjC1
.m/
Z t
mC1
t
m
ersds  c.0/
<
.1/
r
 c.0/
< 0
 V jC1.t1; : : : ; tN /
D
NX
mDjC1
.m/
Z t
mC1
t
m
ersds  c.tjC1/
D Fj .0/:
Here, the second inequality holds by Assumption 3(i) and the third because no firm
receives a negative payoff in equilibrium, because it could always delay investment
indefinitely, thus ensuring a payoff of zero. Moreover, Dj .tjC1/ D 0. Therefore, two
cases are possible: (i) T j  tjC1; in which case 9Tj 2 .0; T j ; such that Dj .Tj / D 0;
and Dj .t/ > 0 in the interval t 2

Tj ; tjC1

; (ii) T j > tjC1; in which case Dj .t/ < 0
and D0j .t/ > 0 8t < tjC1: 
In the next lemma, we analyze decision nodes with one active firm.
LEMMA A.3. In equilibrium, if at time t there is one active firm, it plays “wait” if
t < T N and “invest” if t  T N .
Proof. The result follows immediately from the proof of Lemma 1. 
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In the next lemma, we show that for the case j D N  1; case (i) of Lemma A.2
applies.
LEMMA A.4. T N1 < tN D T N and there is TN1 < T N1 < T N , such that
DN1.TN1/ D 0:
Proof. T N1 < T N by Claim A.1 and tN D T N by Lemma 1. The rest of the statement
follows from Lemma A.2. 
In the next lemma, we show that the .N  1/th equilibrium investment time is
TN1:
LEMMA A.5. In equilibrium, it holds that (i) in all subgames starting at t 2
ŒTN1; T N /, if there are n > 1 active firms, n  1 investments take place at t; (ii)
in all subgames starting at t 2 Œ0; TN1/, if there are n D 2 active firms, each of them
plays “wait”; (iii) tN1 D TN1 and the equilibrium payoff of the last two investors
is the same.
Proof. Part (i). We start from the observation that if t belongs to the interval
.TN1; T N /, then DN1.t/ > 0, while if t D TN1, then DN1.t/ D 0. The proof
now consists of three steps. Step (a) identifies two strategy profiles that generate
the same outcome and constitute an equilibrium for any subgame with n > 1 active
firms starting at t 2 .TN1; T N /. Step (b) rules out any other candidate equilibrium
for subgames with n > 1 active firms starting at t 2 .TN1; T N /: Step (c) considers
subgames with n > 1 active firms starting exactly at t D TN1:
(a) We first show that it is an equilibrium for any subgame with n > 1 active firms
starting at t 2 .TN1; T N / that each active firm plays “invest” at all times   t , unless
it is the only active firm.20 The outcome of this candidate equilibrium is that all active
firms try to invest immediately at t , until only one is left. The last active firm will then
wait to invest until time T N by Lemma A.3. The associated payoff for each firm is a
lottery between LN1.t/ and FN1.t/ with probability 1=n assigned to FN1.t/.
Suppose one firm deviates and plays “wait” at t , although it is not the only active
firm. We show that any deviation involving the play of “wait” at t when one or
more other firms are active gives a smaller payoff than the payoff in the candidate
equilibrium. We need to distinguish three possible classes of deviations according to
the specific circumstances when the deviator plays “wait”.
First, consider the class of deviations in which the firm plays “wait” at t if at least
one other firm is active. At t , the n  1 non-deviating firms follow the given strategies,
and hence n  1 investments occur at t and the deviating firm becomes the last active
firm. By Claim A.1, the most profitable deviation in this class is the one in which the
deviator later invests at T N . The associated payoff is FN1.t/, which is smaller than
the lottery between LN1.t/ and FN1.t/ given by the candidate equilibrium.
20. The proof that the above profile is an equilibrium also proves that the following strategy profile,
which generates the same outcome, is an equilibrium: In all subgames with n > 1 active firms starting at
t 2 .T
N1
; T 
N
/ each active firm plays “wait” at t and “invest” at all times  > t , unless it is the only
active one.
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Second, consider the class of deviations in which the firm plays “wait” at t if the
number of active firms is different from n  l , for a given l such that n  l > 1. At t ,
the n  1 nondeviating firms follow the given strategies. The deviation outcome is the
following. First, the n  1 nondeviating firms will play “invest” until l investments will
occur. Then, when there are n  l active firms left, all of them, including the deviator,
will play “invest”. With probability 1=.n  l/, the deviating firm will successfully
invest and receive payoff LN1.t/. With the complementary probability, the deviating
firm will fail to invest. In the latter case, the game enters a subgame with n  l  1
active firms in which all firms except for the deviator will continue to play “invest”
at t , until the deviator is the only active firm. By Claim A.1, we can again identify
the most profitable deviation within this class: If the outcome of the randomization
device is such that the deviator is unsuccessful in investing when there are n  l active
firms, the deviator will be the last active firm remaining. In this case, it should then
invest at T N . Hence, the highest payoff in this class of deviations is a lottery between
LN1.t/ and FN1.t/, with probability .n  l  1/=.n  l/ assigned to FN1.t/,
which is worse than the lottery deriving from the candidate equilibrium strategies
because .n  l  1/=.n  l/ > 1=n.
Third, an analogous argument shows that the class of deviations in which the firm
plays “wait” at t if the number of active firms is different from n  l , for a set of at
least two integers l; such that n  l > 1 for every l , the highest possible payoff is a
lottery between LN1.t/ and FN1.t/, which assigns to FN1.t/ a higher probability
than the lottery deriving from the candidate equilibrium strategies.
(b) Next, we show that if t belongs to the interval TN1; T N , no strategy profile
different from the ones presented in (a) constitutes an equilibrium. We need to rule out
two classes of strategy profiles: one in which at t , with n active firms, one or more firm
plays “wait” and one or more firms play “invest”, and one in which all active firms
play “wait” in an interval with positive measure starting at t .
We develop the argument by induction. First, we show that it holds for n D 2 active
firms. Then, we show that if it holds for n D m  2; then it holds for n D m C 1.
Finally, we conclude that it holds for any n  2 by the induction principle.
The statement holds for n D 2: We consider two classes of strategy profiles: one
in which at t , with two active firms, one firm plays “wait” and the other plays “invest”,
and one in which both active firms play “wait” in an interval with positive measure
starting at t .
No strategy profile in the first class can be an equilibrium, because the firm who
plays “wait” ends up being the last active firm in the game, thus receiving a payoff no
larger than FN1.t/, while it could profitably deviate by playing “invest” and receiving
a lottery between LN1.t/ and FN1.t/.
Strategy profiles in the second class imply that the first investment in the
subgame occurs strictly later than t and weakly before T N (by Lemma 1), at some
 2 .t; T N , and the second at T N by Lemma A.3. The strategy profiles for which
both firms play “invest” at  cannot be an equilibrium because both firms get
.1=2/

LN1./ C FN1./

while each of them could deviate by investing at   "
and receiving LN1.  "/. By continuity, 9" > 0 small enough that this is profitable.
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The strategy profiles for which only one of the two firms plays “invest” at  cannot be
an equilibrium. The firm who does not invest at  must invest at T N by Lemma A.3,
thus receiving FN1./. It could profitably deviate by investing at   " and getting
LN1.  "/.
If the statement holds for m, it holds for m C 1. Again, we need to consider two
classes of strategy profiles: one in which at time t , with m C 1 active firms, only
 < m C 1 play “invest”, with  > 0, and one in which all active firms play “wait” in
an interval with positive measure starting at t .
No strategy profile in the first class can be an equilibrium. At t , one of the  firms
will successfully invest and the game will enter a subgame with m active firms and
calendar time t . Given the assumption that the statement holds for n D m, in such a
subgame all m active firms invest immediately until only one is left, which invests
at T N . Hence, each of them receives payoff LN1.t/ with probability .m  1/=m
and payoff FN1.t/ with probability 1=m. This implies that any of the m C 1  
firms who play “wait” at t when there are still m C 1 active firms receives expected
payoff .1=m/Œ.m  1/LN1.t/ C FN1.t/. It could profitably deviate by playing
“invest” at t with m C 1 active firms. This deviation is profitable because it increases
the probability of receiving LN1.t/ and decreases the probability of receiving
FN1.t/.
Strategy profiles in the second class imply that the first investment in the subgame
occurs strictly later than t and weakly before T N (by Lemma 1), at some  2 .t; T N .
Consider any such profile and denote by  D 1; : : : ; m C 1 the number of firms who
play “invest” at time  if there are m C 1 active firms. At  , one succesful investment
occurs and the game enters a subgame with m active firms. Given the assumption that
the statement holds for n D m, at  all the m remaining active firms invest immediately
until only one is left, who invests at T N . For  < m C 1, there is at least one firm who
initally plays “wait” at  . This firm receives .1=m/Œ.m  1/LN1./ C FN1./.
It could profitably deviate by investing at   " and receiving LN1.  "/ which
is a larger payoff, for " small enough. If instead  D m C 1, all firms receive
payoff 1=.m C 1/ŒmLN1./ C FN1./. Each of them could profitably deviate by
preempting the opponents and investing at   ". This would yield payoff LN1.  "/
which is larger than the above, for " small enough.
This completes the induction argument and we can conclude that if t belongs to
the interval .TN1; T N /, no strategy profile different from the ones presented in (a)
constitutes an equilibrium.
(c) We conclude by considering subgames with n > 1 active firms, starting at
t D TN1. While DN1.t/ > 0 for t 2 .TN1; T N /, on the other hand DN1.t/ D 0
for t D TN1. This implies that the proof in step (a) also holds for subgames starting
at t D TN1. Hence the profiles analyzed in (a) also constitute an equilibrium for
the subgames with n > 1 active firms, starting at t D TN1. Now consider step (b).
It shows that for for t 2 .TN1; T N / strategy profiles in two classes cannot be an
equilibrium: profiles in which at t , with n active firms, one or more firm plays
“wait” and one or more firms play “invest”, and profiles in which all active firms
play “wait” in an interval with positive measure starting at t . For subgames starting
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at t D TN1 instead, while it is true that profiles in the second class cannot be an
equilibrium, strategy profiles in the first class are an equilibrium. The outcome of
such a profile is that n  1 investments occur at TN1 and one occurs at T N . All
players receive payoff LN1.TN1/ D FN1

TN1

. Hence, there is no profitable
deviation.
Part (ii). If t belongs to the interval Œ0; TN1/, it holds that LN1.t/ < FN1.t/
and that LN1.t/ is increasing. Given part .i/ of this Lemma, and Lemma A.3, if firms
follow the actions prescribed in part .i i/ the expected payoff for each of them is
1
2

LN1.TN1/ C FN1.TN1/
 D LN1.TN1/ D FN1.TN1/
where the equality comes from the definition of TN1: The deviation payoff from
investing at some  before TN1 is LN1./ < LN1.TN1/, hence this is an
equilibrium.
Next, we show that there is no other action profile compatible with equilibrium.
Suppose that   2 firms play “invest” at : The equilibrium payoff for any of these
early investors is
1


LN1./ C .  1/FN1./

:
Each of them could profitably deviate by playing “wait” at ; since FN1./ >
LN1./. This concludes the proof of part .i i/.
Part (iii). The conclusion that tN1 D TN1 follows directly from parts (i) and (ii)
and from Lemma A.3. By construction of TN1, this implies rent equalization for the
last two investors. 
We now identify the algorithm for the construction of the equilibrium investment
times tj for j 2 f1; : : : ; N  1g: The argument is based on the induction principle.
Lemma A.6 contains a statement for j D N  2: Lemma A.7 shows that if the
same statement holds for j D N  l; then it holds for j D N  l  1: Lemma A.8
concludes that, by the induction principle, the statement holds for a general j:
LEMMA A.6. Given tN D T N and tN1 D TN1; tN2 can be constructed as
follows.
Part (a). Suppose T N2 < TN1: In equilibrium it holds that: .i/ in all subgames
starting at t 2 ŒTN2; TN1/, if there are n > 2 active firms, n  2 investments take
place at t; (ii) in all subgames starting at t 2 Œ0; TN2/, if there are 3 active firms, each
of them plays “wait”; and .i i i/ tN2 D TN2 and the payoff of the last 3 investors is
equalized.
Part (b). Suppose T N2  TN1. In equilibrium it holds that: .i/ in all subgames
starting at t 2 Œ0; TN1/, if there are n D 3 active firms, each of them plays “wait”;
and .i i/ tN2 D TN1 and the payoff of the last three investors is equalized.
Proof. Part (a). By Lemma A.2 .i/, 9TN2 2 .0 < T N2, such that DN2.TN2/ D
0. The proofs of parts (i) and (ii) follow from arguments similar to the proofs of parts
(i) and (ii) of Lemma A.5, respectively.
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The conclusion that tN2 D TN2 follows directly from parts (i) and (ii) and from
Lemmata A.5 and A.3. By construction of TN2, this implies rent equalization for the
last three firms.
Part (b). By Lemma A.2 .i i/, LN2.t/ < FN2.t/ and L0N2.t/ > 0 8t < TN1:
The proof of part .i/ follows from arguments analogous to the proof of part .i i/ of
Lemma A.5. The conclusion that tN2 D tN1 D TN1 follows directly from part
.i/ and from Lemmata A.3 and A.5. By construction of TN1, this implies rent
equalization for the last three firms. 
LEMMA A.7. If the following statement holds for j D N  l; with l  2; then
it holds for j D N  l  1. Given the last N  j equilibrium investment times
(tjC1; : : : ; tN /, and given rent equalization for the last .N  j / investors, the j th
equilibrium investment time tj can be constructed as follows:
Part (a). Suppose T j < tjC1: In equilibrium it holds that: .i/ in all subgames
starting at t 2 ŒTj ; tjC1/, if there are n > N  j active firms, n  N C j investments
take place at t; .i i/ in all subgames starting at t 2 Œ0; Tj /, if there are n D N  j C 1
active firms, each of them plays “wait”; and .i i i/ tj D Tj and the payoff of the last
N  j C 1 investors is equalized.
Part (b). Suppose T j  tjC1: In equilibrium it holds that: .i/ in all subgames
starting at t 2 Œ0; tjC1, if there are n D N  j C 1 active firms, each of them plays
“wait”; and .i i/ tj D tjC1 and the payoff of the last N  j C 1 investors is equalized.
Proof. Assume that the statement holds for j D N  l . This implies that either tNl D
TNl or tNl D tNlC1; and that in both cases payoffs of the last l C 1 investors are
equalized. Now we need to prove that the statement holds for j D N  l  1: Part (a).
By Lemma A.2 .i/, 9TNl1 2 .0 < T Nl1, such that DNl1.TNl1/ D 0. The
proofs of parts (i) and (ii) follow from arguments similar to the proofs of parts (i) and
(ii) of Lemma A.5, respectively. For part (iii), the conclusion that tNl1 D TNl1
follows directly from parts (i) and (ii) and from the assumptions. By construction of
TNl1, this implies rent equalization for the last l C 2 firms. Part (b). By Lemma
A.2 (ii), DNl1.t/ < 0 and D0Nl1.t/ > 0 8t < tNl . The proof of part (i) follows
from arguments analogous to the proof of part (ii) of Lemma A.5. The conclusion
that tNl1 D TNl follows directly from part (i) and from the assumptions. By
construction of TNl , this implies rent equalization for the last l C 2 firms. 
LEMMA A.8. The statement in Lemma A.7 holds for any j  N  2:
Proof. The result follows from Lemmata A.6 and A.7 by the induction principle. 
Proof of Proposition 2. First, suppose that the profit structure  is such that tj < tjC1.
By construction, tj solves,
.j /
r

e
rt
j  ertjC1  .c.tj /  c.tjC1// D 0:
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Differentiating implicitly yields
@tj
@.j /
D 

e
rt
j  ertjC1 =r
.j /ertj  c0.tj /
:
The numerator is positive, because tj < tjC1. The denominator is positive as well,
because in equilibrium tj < T jC1. Therefore, tj is decreasing in .j /. Next, suppose
instead that the profit structure  is such that tj D tjC1. That is, suppose that the
profit structure  is such that tjC1  T j . If a marginal change in .j / does not affect
the inequality tjC1  T j , tj is affected only by the flow-profit parameters that affect
tjC1, hence it is constant in .j /. If instead a marginal change in .j / changes the
inequality to tjC1 > T j , we fall into the previous case and tj decreases.
Proof of Proposition 3. Suppose that for a given profit structure , tjk < tj . We
prove that there exists O.j / such that for the modified game with profit structure
Q with Q.l/ D .l/ for all l  j  k and all l > j , Q.j / 2 . O.j /; .j  k// and
Q.l/ > Q.l C 1/ for all l , investment times tjk and tj are clustered.
For the profit structure , let z  1 be the number of investments occurring jointly
in equilibrium at the beginning of the subgame played among the last N  j C 1
players, so that tj D : : : D tjCz1. Suppose z D 1. The proof of Proposition 2 shows
that in this case tj strictly decreases in .j /. Moreover, lim.j /!.jk/ T j D T jk .
Since tj < T j , there exists a O.j / large enough that tj < T jk in any modified
game with profit structure Q with Q.l/ D .l/ for all l  j  k and all l > j ,
Q.j / 2 . O.j /; .j  k// and Q.l/ > Q.l C 1/ for all l . Now suppose that instead
z > 1. The fact that tjk < tj implies that T jk < tj D tjCz1. Since T j is
strictly decreasing in .j / and lim.j /!.jk/ T j D T jk < tjCz1, there exists
a .j / sufficiently close to .j  k/ such that T j < tjC1 D : : : D tjCz1, and
tj < T

j < tjC1 in any modified game with profit structure N with N.l/ D .l/ for
all l  j  k and all l > j , N.j / 2 ..j /; .j  k// ; and N.l/ > N.l C 1/ for all
l . Then, starting from the game with profit structure N the proof for the case z D 1
applies.
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